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NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY.
By TELFORD TAYLOR. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1970.
Pp. 224. $5.95.
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.-
I have very little fault to find with Professor Taylor's exposition
of the law, both our own constitutional law and the international law of
war, applicable to the hostilities in Vietnam. It appears accurate, lucid,
and reasonable-an extraordinarily good summary, for the lay as well
as the legal reader, of some extraordinarily difficult legal problems. In
particular, I am in complete agreement with his conclusion that the law
of war, as difficult as it may be to apply and enforce, is very much better
than no law at all. Its existence has averted a great deal of suffering in
the wars which have afflicted our species during the last half century
or so.'
I have, of course, a few caveats about some of Professor Taylor's
suggestions. For example, while agreeing that it might well be
preferable to try the American soldiers accused of war crimes in the
Song My incident before special military commissions composed of
civilian lawyers and judges, instead of before courts-martial, I have
some doubt whether that could legally be done. Certainly, if I were
counsel for one of the accused, I could make a strong argument that
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 2 he is entitled to trial by
general court-martial, with all the protection that implies.
Likewise, I have greater doubt than Professor Taylor as to the
validity of the so-called "Nuremberg defense," a concept which in
essence would permit an individual lawfully to refuse to obey orders to
participate in training for combat in Vietnam, to go to Vietnam, or even
to report for induction, on the ground that compliance with such orders
would put him in a position in which he would be compelled to commit
violations of the law of war.3 My trouble with the concept is that I do
not believe its basic premise. With few exceptions, the only violations
of the law of war for which people have been punished have been
deliberate, voluntary acts which the perpetrators must have realized
were war crimes and which they were under no real compulsion to
commit. An American soldier of ordinary intelligence and ordinary
moral courage certainly can refrain from committing war crimes with-
out fear of legal punishment, and he probably can do so without fear
of extralegal penalties. Indeed, it seems obvious that the great majority
of American soldiers do so refrain.
' Richard Ely Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B. 1936, Dartmouth Col-
lege; LL.B. 1940, Harvard University. Member, District of Columbia Bar.
I T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 40 (1970).
2 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
3 T. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 15.
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But even on these matters Professor Taylor's position and mine
are not very far apart. Overall this is a commendable book. I would
feel much happier about the world if such a work could be published, or
even read, in China or Russia or North Vietnam.
I agree also with Professor Taylor's conclusion in his chapter
on Aggressive War that the "crimes against peace" principle of the
Nuremberg Charter cannot usefully be applied to the fighting in Viet-
nam, any more than it can be applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict. One
of the many unique things about Adolf Hitler was that he scarcely
bothered to claim that the Third Reich was the victim of aggression.
World War II was one of the very few wars in history in which it
could be said with something like certainty which side started it. On
the evidence available, I incline toward the opinion that North Vietnam
bears the major part of the responsibility for the breach of the 1954
Geneva Accord 4 and the initiation of violence in South Vietnam; but
the situation is sufficiently tangled so that I am left with that reasonable
doubt which, under our system of criminal law, forbids a conviction.
The core of the book is devoted to breaches in Vietnam of the con-
ventional law of war. There can be no doubt that American soldiers
have sometimes-far too often-been guilty of violations of those pro-
visions of the Geneva Conventions which are clearly applicable, par-
ticularly in the mistreatment and killing of noncombatants and prisoners
of war who were not in a position to commit hostile acts.' The Song
My massacre, whoever was responsible for it, is an example of such a
clear violation, although as Professor Taylor recognizes,6 it seems to
have been an extraordinary and perhaps unique episode. And, as
Professor Taylor says, even it "pales into . . . insignificance" 7 when
compared to some of the atrocities committed by the enemy.
Indeed, it may be that the root of the problem is exposed by
Professor Taylor when he points out that North Vietnam and the
Vietcong simply refuse to be bound by the conventional law of war.'
Professor Falk, like their other champions, argues in substance that
military necessity justifies that refusal.' As a practical matter, this
argument cannot be lightly brushed aside. It is clear that if they, or
the Palestinian guerrillas, were to adhere to the Hague Regulations,' °
the Geneva Conventions,"' and the rest of the conventional law of war,
particularly the fundamental principle that combatants are to be dis-
4 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, in IV MAJOR PEACE
TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY: 1648-1967, at 2689 (F. Israel ed. 1967).
5 See, e.g., conventions cited note 13 infra.
6 T. TAYLOR, .'pra note 1, at 139.
7Id. 171.
8 Id. 135-36, 173.
DId. 137, citing 2 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE VIErAm
WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (R. Falk ed. 1969).
'0 Annex to Convention between the United States and other Powers Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295 (1911).
"1 See, e.g., conventions cited note 13 infra.
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tinguishable from, and as far as possible separated from, noncombatants,
they would have small chance of military success. The difficulty is that
if military necessity justifies the tactics of the guerrillas, it may also
justify at least some of the tactics employed against them. Professor
Taylor seems to incline toward the opinion that there should be a strong
presumption against involvement in hostilities against an enemy whose
tactics and strategy make it exceedingly difficult to resist him without
endangering people whose deepest desire is to take no part at all in the
fighting."2 But the logical end of this reasoning would be that an
aggressive power, determined to subject other people to its rule by
force, cannot be resisted, if only it is sufficiently unscrupulous-that is,
if it is willing to create conditions in which resistance will inevitably
bring suffering upon innocent people. It is in essence the problem of
the airplane hijacking.
Nevertheless, I do not think, and Professor Taylor does not think,
that a civilized power, or one which wishes to be civilized, must or
should scrap the laws of war simply because its enemy does so. At a
minimum, it can comply with the very basic provision of article III of
each of the Geneva Conventions, which provides that in the case of
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the terri-
tory of one of the high contracting parties, "[p] ersons taking no active
part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have
laid down their arms . . . shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely . . . " ' and which provides that such persons shall not be
subjected to violence, murder, or the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court. More
broadly, it can refrain from violence which serves no military purpose
or which bears no reasonable proportion to the military end in view.
This is, of course, the declared policy of the United States and its allies,
who assert that the Geneva Conventions are fully applicable to the war
in Vietnam.
As Professor Taylor points out, these policies are already ade-
quately implemented by regulations, orders, directives and so forth.14
The problem is adequate enforcement of those orders, particularly those
requiring reporting, investigation, and prosecution of violations of the
laws of war by American troops. Although there is little evidence that
higher commanders had any direct, affirmative responsibility for what
12 T. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 172, 173.
13 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. III, [19551 6 U.S.T. 3116,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 32 (No. 970) ; Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. III, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3220, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 86 (No. 971); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. III, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S.
136 (No. 972) ; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. III, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3518, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 288 (No. 973).
14 T. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 168-69.
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happened at Song My, there is some evidence to suggest, at least, that
as high as division headquarters there was little interest in investi-
gating and prosecuting those who may have been responsible. Pro-
fessor Tayor is clearly right in saying that the legal priciples of In re
Yamashita 15 are as applicable to American as to Japanese commanders;
it is their duty under both American and international law to take such
steps as are reasonably within their power "to insure compliance with
the law of war or to punish violators thereof." " I would hope, how-
ever, that no commander, American or foreign, will ever again be con-
victed on such evidence as that in the Yamashita case, or the similar
case of In re Hirota.1
7
This principle in turn requires that those whose personal morality
does not forbid such acts must be deterred by fear of punishment. If
investigation develops evidence of such clear-cut violations of the law
of war as seem to have occurred at Song My, there should be courts-
martial not only of those directly responsible but also of those who
condone such conduct or fail to take reasonable measures to prevent it.
I emphasize again that I have not as yet seen convincing evidence of
such condonation or acquiescence at higher levels of command. And
such trials should not be propaganda trials; like other courts-martial
for serious offenses, they should ensure the accused all the protection
to which he is entitled under the Uniform Code and the Constitution.
Such a course is not politically easy. Although the Army may
seem to be doing less than it should to prosecute violations of the law
of war committed by its own forces, it is doing more than has ever
been done by any other belligerent during hostilities. As Professor
Taylor makes clear, in the past the trial and punishment of war criminals
has almost invariably taken place after defeat and in the courts of a
totally victorious enemy. It is to the credit of the United States that
even prior to the breaking of the Song My story it had court-martialed
and convicted some of its own soldiers for crimes committed against
noncombatants and prisoners of war. We should continue this policy,
and more vigorously than we have in the past. A very large section
of the public will, as Professor Taylor points out, ask the very human
question why we should punish our own people for acts which the
enemy commits much oftener and more brutally, when that enemy not
only does not discourage such conduct by his own forces, but boasts
of it. The only possible answer, I think, is that we have been, and wish
to remain, a relatively civilized nation-I emphasize the word rela-
15 [1946] Ann. Dig. Pub. Int'l Law Cases 255 (1945) (No. 111) (U.S. Military
Comm'n, Manila), petition for habeas corpus & prohibition denied sub nom. Yamashita
v. Styer, 75 Philippine R. 563 (1945), cert. & leave to file petitions for writs of
habeas corpus and prohibition denied, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
10 DEP'T OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 1 501
(1956); cf. id. 507(b).
17 [1948] Ann. Dig. Pub. Int'l Law Cases 356 (1948) (No. 118) (Int'l Military
Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo), leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus
denied sub nor. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam).
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tively-with a tradition of respect for law, and that if we emulate the
enemy's brutality we lose not only the respect of other civilized nations,
but our self-respect.
The broader question raised by Professor Taylor, too broad to
discuss now, is whether it is possible to devise some minimum, funda-
mental law to mitigate the brutality of what Chairman Mao calls "wars
of national liberation." To have any chance of observance, such laws
must be acceptable even to belligerents like the Vietcong or the Arab
guerrillas in Palestine. (North Vietnam, of course, is in a different
position; I can see no military or political purpose of that government
which is served by its refusal to comply with the Geneva Prisoner of
War Convention.) It will not be easy to work out even such minimal
rules. And yet even the Palestinian guerrillas have little to gain from
firing rockets into school buses and killing children. At any rate,
lawyers and soldiers ought to give more thought to the shape of the
laws which might govern even the hit-and-run guerrilla wars which
have become common in many parts of the world in the last quarter
of a century.
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